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In his theory of communicative action, Habermas posits that language is a fundamentally intersubjective 
tool used for the activity of reaching mutual understanding. Interlocutors assume the freedom to question 
claims made in discourse and use reason to achieve communicative power together. Thus language in 
itself forms the drive mechanism of successful discourse—that is, only by presupposing the ability of 
other subjects to take language as an alterable, reason-based, and empowering tool is mutually 
recognitive dialogue possible. However, beyond these basic presuppositions, speakers maintain, I argue, 
an acute appreciation for the particular ways of speaking—what Bakhtin termed “speech genres”—at 
work in conversation. It is my position that sensitivity to the influence that speech genre choices have on 
the subjectivities in dialogue poses the subject as ethically responsible for the co-creation of ways of 
speaking that are more or less enabling for interlocutors in context. While speakers use the norms of 
communication in different social and institutional spheres to inform their choice of utterance, these 
norms depend as well on changing, contextualized patterns of speech. Thus the subject takes an active 
stance in dialogue: communicative freedom allows the subject a bearing in the utterance act as a re-




In his theory of communicative action, Habermas posits that language is a 
fundamentally intersubjective tool used for the activity of reaching mutual 
understanding.1 Interlocutors assume the freedom to question claims made in discourse 
and use reason to achieve communicative power together.2 Thus language in itself 
forms the drive mechanism of successful discourse—that is, only by presupposing the 
ability of other subjects to take language as an alterable, reason-based, and empowering 
                                               
1
 Jürgen Habermas, “Actions, Speech Acts, Linguistically Mediated Interactions, and the Lifeworld,” in 
On the Pragmatics of Communication, ed. Maeve Cooke (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998), 215-255. 
 
2
 See Klaus Günther, “Communicative Freedom, Communicative Power, and Jurisgenesis,” in Habermas 
on Law and Democracy: Critical Exchanges, eds. Michel Rosenfeld and Andrew Arato (Berkeley, CA: 
University of California Press, 1998), 234–254, for a concise explanation of these terms. 
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tool is mutually recognitive dialogue possible.3 However, beyond these basic 
presuppositions, speakers maintain, I argue, an acute appreciation for the particular 
ways of speaking—what Bakhtin termed “speech genres”4,5—at work in conversation. I 
claim that sensitivity to the influence speech genre choices have on the subjectivities in 
dialogue poses the subject as ethically responsible for the co-creation6 of ways of 
speaking that are more or less enabling for interlocutors in context. While speakers use 
the norms of communication in different social and institutional spheres to inform their 
choice of utterance, these norms depend as well on changing, contextualized patterns of 
speech.7 Thus the subject takes an active stance in dialogue: communicative freedom 
allows the subject a bearing in the utterance as a re-articulator of speech genre, as one 
who can therefore influence generic norms. 
 
Because Habermas does not have a sophisticated account of semiotics at the level of the 
utterance act, he cannot approach communicative interaction with the same level of 
precision as Bakhtin. For Bakhtin, the utterance is the location of subjective bearing on 
an issue which cannot occur in routinized, systematic, or “sedimented” language. 
Indeed, these abstract forms acquire value only by removing the subjective impulse, the 
“eruption” of meaning which happens as a result of this or that particular subject’s 
issuing a response to language “as such” from the subject's place (a gap) in the 
dialogic-symbolic order.8 Bakhtin, by focusing on the utterance act as the locus of 
                                               
3
 Jürgen Habermas, “What is Universal Pragmatics?” in On the Pragmatics of Communication, ed. 
Maeve Cooke (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998), 21-103. 
 
4
 M. M. Bakhtin, “The Problem of Speech Genres,” in Speech Genres & Other Late Essays, trans. Vern 




 See Gary Saul Morson and Caryl Emerson, Mikhail Bakhtin: Creation of a Prosaics (Stanford, CA: 
Stanford University Press, 1990) throughout for a comprehensive overview of Bakhtin’s work. 
 
6
 Dialogue is arguably Bakhtin’s most important conceptual focus (see Michael Holquist, Dialogism 
[New York: Routledge, 1990]). Grappling with the new problems in theories of perception and 
temporality inaugurated by the work of Einstein and Bohr, Bakhtin attempted to work out the 
implications for self-other relations, especially with regard to communication. His emphasis on what 
might be called the “aesthetics” of communication—that is, the ways in which two individuals engage in 
linguistic and bodily semiotic exchange in order to create coherent understandings of self and other that 
expand the signifying boundaries of both—is featured most prominently in Bakhtin’s major work on 
aesthetics/ethics, Art and Answerability: Early Philosophical Essays, eds. Michael Holquist and Vadim 
Liapunov (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1990), as well as in his analysis of the author-hero 
relationship in Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics, trans./ed. Caryl Emerson (Minneapolis, MN: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1984). 
 
7
 (as an aside) Working at the intersection of semantics and pragmatics, François Recanati offers a robust 
defense of Contextualism in Literal Meaning (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press: 2004). 
8
 See Bakhtin, Dostoevsky’s Poetics, esp. 5-77, for more about the dialogic relationship. I also want to 
make an analogy to Lacan’s notion of the subject. In Écrits, trans. Bruce Funk (New York: W. W. Norton 
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fundamental tension9 between the subject’s take and the other’s take, between speech 
and system, subjective bearing and historical ideology, etc., exposes the identity-
constituting nature of speech communication. In other words, Bakhtin is able to 
concretize Habermas’ theory of communicative interaction in order that the deeply 
existential10 problems involved in the interaction of conflicting voices in dialogue 
finally come to light.  
 
While individual utterance acts are unique, different spheres of communication depend 
upon relatively stable types of utterances or speech genres. Primary genres, those used 
by speakers in context, include the everyday rejoinder or simple written message. 
Secondary genres, on the other hand, re-present primary genres in an abstracted form, 
such as the novel, dramatic work, scientific research paper, or legal transcript; here, the 
original context of the utterance is removed and the utterance no longer “belongs” to 
the original speakers but instead conforms to the patterns of expression in the larger 
work (i.e., it is a new utterance).11 Speech genres regulate the style of the utterance act 
by outlining the norms for the construction of the whole, including its completion and 
the relation to be enacted between speaker and hearer.12 The boundaries between 
utterances consist in the change of speaking subjects; the speaker ends her utterance in 
order to “relinquish the floor to the other or to make room for the other's active 
responsive understanding.”13 The point at which this change occurs Bakhtin calls 
“finalization,” involving three main factors: (1) the semantic exhaustiveness of the 
theme (what needs to be said), (2) the speaker's speech plan (subjective bearing), and 
(3) the rules for finalization of a typical utterance in the genre. 
 
Because every utterance act is unique, each demands accountability of the subject. But 
the act represents the agency of the speaker to a greater or lesser degree depending on 
the genre of speech in which the act is performed. Artistic genres, for instance, involve 
a high level of subjective expression because they demand creativity from the 
                                                                                                                   
& Company, 2007), 678, Lacan says, “The cut made by the signifying chain is the only cut that verifies 
the structure of the subject as a discontinuity in the real.” That is, the subject first makes its appearance as 
a “break” in the perfect functioning of the symbolic order. 
 
9
 Ibid., p. 32. Also, Bakhtin, Speech Genres, esp. 90-91. 
 
10
 See Art & Answerability for Bakhtin’s most thorough discussion. 
 
11
 One of Bakhtin’s key insights is that secondary genres are able to re-articulate and re-interpret in more 
or less enabling ways the thematic, stylistic, and compositional concerns of the primary genre; there is, to 
a greater or lesser extent, a “restructuring or renewal” of the genres of everyday speech through 
secondary genres. See Bakhtin, Speech Genres, 66. 
 
12
 Ibid., 64. 
 
13
 Ibid., 71. 
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individual as constitutive of the act itself. In contrast, utterances in the most highly 
regulated speech genres, such as the military command or legal document, assume only 
minimal subjective quality, limited to an almost “epiphenomenal” result of the simple 
fact that a particular person uttered this particular speech act.14 On Bakhtin's view, the 
speaker's choice of speech genre has a profound impact on the meaning of the utterance 
and on the composition of the dialogue itself; what the speaker says in her choice of 
speech genre is as much a part of the dialogue as what she intends to mean by the 
utterance within that genre, and indeed, interlocutors always speak in concrete speech 
genres.15 
Consequently, the utterance achieves its answerability16—its status as an ethical claim 
on the subject—solely in the context of speech genre. And because the utterance act is 
the place of tension in virtue of which a speech genre coheres as an object of analysis, 
speech genres as such cannot be presupposed in a stable form in dialogue. Thus 
recognition of another's utterance act must involve recognition of the other's capacity 
for re-orienting dialogue toward renewing the components of speech genres. If 
interlocutors are to recognize one another as truly capable of accepting or rejecting 
validity claims (per Habermas), then they must also maintain sensitivity to the speech 
genres in use, specifically with regard to the more or less enabling capacity of the 





The Normativity of Dialogue 
 
On Bakhtin's view, when interlocutors participate in dialogue they assume an active 
stance; they always anticipate a rejoinder from the other. Even “from the speaker's first 
                                               
14
 Bakhtin, Speech Genres. One can already see the threat to communicative freedom when regulative 
speech limits the individual’s capacity to self-orient, to assert oneself as a bearer of the right to accept or 
to reject the truth, sincerity, or rightness of the utterance act. 
 
15
 Ibid., 78: “Even in the most free, the most unconstrained conversation, we cast our speech in definite 
generic forms, sometimes rigid and trite ones, sometimes more flexible, plastic, and creative ones.” Also, 
in Bakhtin, “Discourse in the Novel,” in The Dialogic Imagination, ed. Michael Holquist, trans. Caryl 
Emerson and Michael Holquist (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1982), 293: “[T]here are no 
‘neutral’ words and forms [….] Language is not an abstract system of normative forms but rather a 
concrete heteroglot conception of the world. All words have the ‘taste’ of a profession, a genre, a 
tendency […] Each word tastes of the context and contexts in which it has lived its socially charged life.” 
 
16
 See Michael Holquist, “Answering as Authoring: Mikhail Bakhtin’s Trans-Linguistics,” Critical 
Theory 10 (1983): 307-319. 
 
17
 Here I mean the ability to realize one’s fundamental valuational stances from a position of uncoerced 
self-identification within the word as well as the intersubjectivity of dialogue itself. 
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word,” he says, the listener begins to agree or disagree, to augment or apply it.18 
Moreover, this responsive take consists both in the bodily response (perhaps in silence), 
in the speech act, and/or in the action which “answering” the speech act entails (e.g., 
following a command). The important thing to note is that, because there is no clear 
dichotomy between “speaker” and “hearer”—that is, because “from the first word” (or 
even before) we anticipate the speaker's take on the speech genre and already, in a 
sense, begin to speak ourselves—one's choice of speech genre has an effect on the 
other's subsequent speech choices. That is, a rational acceptance of one's capacity to 
affect (in a more or less enabling way) the ability of the other to maintain a non-
coercive space for self-assertion is a precondition for entering a dialogic relationship of 
mutual recognition. 
 
Constitutive of such a relationship, then, is the realization that one’s speech-generic 
choices carry ethical weight. By accepting this demand, adopting receptivity to the 
alteration of the three main components of speech genres, interlocutors show their 
concern for the ways in which their own speech affects the other. From such a stance, 
moreover, they effectively demonstrate an openness to radically new forms (or even 
reversals) of speech norms and thus to the unrestricted self-positing of the other. Such 
openness, however, requires more than simply allowing the other a “place at the table,” 
as Habermas would have it. Subjects also maintain empathy or affective attunement to 
the other’s experience; in Searle's formal pragmatic terms, they respect the other's 
reference to the Background and Network19 that ground the very possibility of 
subjectivity in the lifeworld.  
 
Bakhtin illustrates the inherent vulnerability to (and of) the other in language with his 
notion of the “double-voiced” word: the utterance act incorporates both the subject’s 
voice and the imagined voice of the other.20 Therefore both external and internal 
dialogue involve a juxtaposition of opposites, he says, of conflicting meanings and 
value-stances, such that in every voice there are “two contending voices,” there is 
“confidence and lack of confidence simultaneously;” every experience is “accompanied 
                                               
18
 Bakhtin, Speech Genres, 68. 
 
19
 For Searle, the Background is the set of abilities, capacities, tendencies, and dispositions that humans 
have and that are not in themselves intentional states. The Network involves the beliefs, desires, and 
other intentions necessary for any particular intentional state to make sense. This parallels Bourdieu’s 
habitus, the internalized schemata, sensibilities, dispositions, and taste acquired by a particular subject in 
a particular lifeworld. See also Merleau-Ponty, “The Sensible World and the World of Expression,” 
in Themes from the Lectures at the Collège de France: 1952-1960 (Evanston, IL: Northwestern 
University Press, 1970) for a summary discussion of the body as “expression” of the symbolic in the 
lifeworld, from a phenomenological perspective. 
 
20
 GSM & CE, Bakhtin, esp. 139-159. 
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by a continual sideways glance at another person.”21 This easily intuited idea, that 
speech involves at least two agents—whether imagined and anticipated (e.g., when 
authoring a written work) or tangible and “accessible” as in spoken dialogue—who 
affect one another's choice of word and mode of articulation of the same, reveals the 
power of speakers in context. If words are “double-voiced,” then one's choice of speech 
genre affects more than the discourse trajectory. These choices call whole selves into 
dialogue; choosing words (from, e.g., a common vs. esoteric vocabulary) and modes of 
articulation (e.g., a satirical vs. solemn gesture) affect both the speech and subjectivity 
of the other. 
 
Thus interlocutors make room not only for new linguistic content but also for new ways 
of expressing that content. They don’t simply recognize the presuppositions of 
communicative interaction; nor do they simply acknowledge the basic situation that 
each occupies on her own as an agent with a unique life history. Equally important is 
that they recognize one another as authors of speech genres, the choice of which 
effectively reveals the immanent effects of one’s speech on the other. That is, speakers 
continue to pick up on the slight nuances of speech which occur as the result of the 
subject's casting of her speech in a particular genre. Sensitivity thus demands listening 
and vulnerability to the other22—indeed, one's success in reaching mutual 
understanding here would depend on assuming such a position.  
 
It can be stated, then, that interlocutors choose a speech genre in anticipation of the 
perlocutionary effects23 such a choice will have on the other's sense of her own ability 
to continue dialogue as an uncoercively reflective and volitional subject. Here we can 
see the ways in which a conformist approach to a dialogue between, e.g., a doctor and a 
patient may restrict the openness of one or the other participant (or both) to the self’s 
own freedom to articulate speech that addresses what is really important to the self in 
such an interaction. Clearly, such restrictive interchange is not really dialogue in 
Bakhtin’s sense of the word. True dialogue depends on all participants sharing the 
conviction that through their speech they help to identify (to constitute) and restructure 
the other’s sense of herself. The implication is that before, during, and after 
interlocutors mutually recognize the Habermasian presuppositions, they assume active 
positions as co-creators of a dialogue which to a greater or lesser degree engages the 
other as a subject constituting and constituted by the intersubjective meeting, an 
essential component of which is the continual positing, negotiating, and re-positing of 
                                               
21
 Bakhtin, Dostoevsky’s Poetics, 32. 
 
22
 Recognition would involve this kind of openness as the first and foremost constituent of dialogue—
i.e., as prior to language.   
 
23
 That is, the effects derivative of but not inherent to comprehension of a speech act. See José Medina, 
Language: Key Concepts in Philosophy, 25, for a clarification of the distinction between illocutionary 
and perlocutionary effects. 
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speech genres: sensitivity to speech genre choice is necessary for subjects to really 
recognize each other. 
 
Because interlocutors take a responsive stance toward utterance acts, responses to the 
utterance will be mediated through the speech genre deployed in the act. Speakers 
choose genres knowing that the other’s response will differ qualitatively from the 
response evoked by a different choice of genre. Speech genres can be more or less 
enabling, then, not only because they may presuppose a power relation between the 
participants—as in the dialogue of doctor and patient—but also because these same 
genres have in themselves more or less flexibility. That is, the genres at play in a 
dialogue between doctor and patient may be more or less flexible than those in a 
dialogue between, for example, parent and child. If interlocutors are to facilitate mutual 
understanding in dialogue, then they must recognize the implications of choosing one 
genre over another. 
 
A major consequence of this line of reasoning is that, because subjects call one another 
out into dialogue, it is not enough simply to “accept” or to “tolerate” the other’s speech. 
Here it will help to think of the ambiguous claim of the affluent subject implicitly 
asserting her rejection of classism while in dialogue with an impoverished subject. Of 
course, such a conversation would present numerous challenges to both speakers 
upfront because of differing cultural and linguistic histories, and thus differing points of 
reference in the creation of one or the other’s narrative telling of her (life-) story, all of 
which is predicated (in this example) on the subjects’ varying socioeconomic 
circumstances. But to the point, the affluent subject can take an implicit position of 
acceptance or tolerance which displaces her ethical burden onto a presuppositional (and 
thus unreflective) role, à la the speech genre in play, which determines what “should” 
happen (what one should say) in this case for “recognition” to be satisfied; there is, 
constitutive of this dialogue, reference to a presupposed rule of speech-conduct that 
transgresses both Habermasian and Bakhtinian requirements for mutually recognitive 
dialogue. The false “Other”24 onto which her speech burden—the raw burden of the 
confrontation of affluence and poverty—is displaced allows her to rationalize thus: “we 
have different priorities and we speak in different ways, but I will try to understand 
because I am a fair person,” without actually accepting the consequences of allowing 
herself to be vulnerable to the experience of the other's disadvantaged subjective 
position.  
 
Once this position has been taken, the affluent subject accepts a passive reception of the 
other’s speech in order to understand the basic (de-subjectivized) semantics of the 
                                               
24
 See Slavoj Žižek “Only a Suffering God Can Save Us: Section 2: Kierkegaard,” EBSCO Publishing, 
2007, http://www.lacan.com/zizmarqueemoon.html, for a discussion of this “displacement” of subjective 
burden. 
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utterances at hand, for perhaps no more than pragmatic reasons.25 The affluent subject 
might accept this kind of position in order to protect herself from the perceived 
diminution of her own subjective power at the hands of the impoverished subject. The 
impoverished subject could, in the right kind of dialogue, pull the affluent subject into a 
meaningful dialogue of a kind totally unfamiliar (and possibly threatening). In this 
sense the affluent subject’s position is a rejection of the responsibility to recognize 
oneself as accountable for one's speech-generic choice in the co-creation of meaning, of 
one’s self- and other-constituting activity.  
 
Looking at the dialogic interaction in this light allows us to see why choosing 
“acceptance” and “tolerance” allows the subject to feign understanding and avoid doing 
the hard work of communication; such a resistance is a far cry from the activity of 
Bakhtin’s speaking subject who, as the author for the hero, establishes and re-works for 
the other an “extremely complex and subtle atmosphere that would force him to reveal 
and explain himself dialogically, to catch aspects of himself in others’ consciousnesses, 
to build loopholes for himself.”26 At the individual level, utterance acts, cast in the 
traditional speech genres, overreach the boundaries—the thematic, stylistic, and 
structural components—of those same genres. Introducing even minimally different 
thematic content, subjective style, or patterns of finalization, then, alters what one 
comes to assume to be the standard way of speaking in a certain context.27  
 
Here I have suggested that, because Habermas’ theory of communicative action lacks a 
precise account of the meaning of the utterance act as it plays out in speech genres, he 
is unable to reveal the existential implications for subjects in dialogue. Bakhtin’s work 
is our best source for understanding these issues in a sophisticated manner. It is my 
claim that communicative freedom must include the ability to delimit, in a creative and 
pragmatic way, speech-generic forms. The individual in a truly recognitive relationship 
is only able to adopt a legitimate position from which to respect the other if that same 
individual accepts responsibility for her positing of speech acts through concrete speech 
genres. These generic forms, then, stay open to question, open for dialogue, allowing 
the tripartite structure of speech genres—their thematic, stylistic, and compositional 
elements—to emphasize for interlocutors in context a revisionary account of the ethical 
responsivity inherent in communicative interaction. 
 
 
                                               
25
 This argument should be helpful for discussing race relations, political debate, interfaith dialogue, etc. 
 
26
 Bakhtin, Dostoevsky's Poetics, 54. 
 
27
 See discussions of the critical potential of publics oriented (with a healthy skepticism) toward the 
“spontaneous,” grotesque, and stylistically altered forms of communication crucial for a Bakhtinian 
approach to dialogue and narrative in Beyond Habermas: New Perspectives on the Public Sphere, eds. 
Nick Crossley and John Michael Roberts (Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishing, 2004). 
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